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collective bargaining agreements. A company cannot operate
without assurance that its employees will come to work with rea-
sonable regularity. The question thus arises as to how far a
company's right to discharge or discipline its employees for ab-
senteeism extends. As we have seen, the answer to this problem
is found in contract provisions and in the company rules, sub-
ject to their proper interpretation in the light of the reasons
offered by way of excuse, the employee's previous record of




Throughout the history of collective bargaining both labor
and management have realized the impossibility of smooth pro-
duction amid fights, heated arguments, and like disturbances.
It is thus a broad, general truth that an employer has the right
to discharge employees who participate in an actual fight. The
word "actual" is important, as some friction is to be expected
in the tense atmosphere of modern industrial plants. Lesser
breaches of proper decorum may, of course, result in disciplinary
action short of discharge, and, as we shall see, numerous mitigat-
ing circumstances qualify the rule stated.
It is difficult to isolate those arbitration decisions which im-
pose discipline for fights and altercations alone. Many such
affrays are apt to occur during the process of procuring some
collective bargaining advantages, and they frequently appear
during strikes or in connection with zealous solicitation of union
membership. An employer may entertain an ulterior motive and
disguise it as discipline for a fight or altercation. This discus-
sion, insofar as it is possible, will exclude the topics of coercion
and intimidation, destruction of property, inciting strikes and
boycotts-all of which are grounds for disciplinary action-and
discrimination against union members in disciplinary penalities,
evidence of which will make the penalty unjustified.
Disciplinary action by an employer for fights in the plant
may be based upon the bargaining contract, the past practice
of the company, or a general understanding among employees.,
1. -In re Dayton Malleable Iron Co., G.H.R. Foundry Division and United
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If the employer, by contract, has no right to discharge unless
for "sufficient cause," a fight may be held such cause.2 But the
penalty imposed as discipline must be reasonable and just after
a fair investigation and due consideration of all the facts. An
analysis of fair and unfair penalties, as determined by arbitra-
tion, follows.
II. WHAT IS A "FIGHT" OR "ALTERCATION"?
A breach of peace which interferes with the harmonious oper-
ation of the business enterprise subjects the participants to dis-
ciplinary action. Employees participating in a fight involving
violence may be discharged. This may apply to melees involving
many persons and issues which affect many employees ;3 or to
instances where only two persons engage in a private scuffle.4
When actual blows are exchanged, and the possibility of serious
personal injury is imminent, the most serious breach of proper
Electrical, Radio and Machine Workers of America, Local 768 (CIO), 8
LA 680 (1947), where a discharge was allowed even though no written
rules were posted, and there was no stipulation in the contract that an
employee could be discharged for fighting.
2. In re Kraft Foods Co. and Int. Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs,
Warehousemen and Helpers of America, Dairy Employee's Union, Local
754 (AFL), 9 LA 397 (1947).
3. In re Fulton Glass Company and Federal Labor Union, No. 24080(AFL), 10 LA 75 (1948) (reinstatement without back pay ordered for
reasons not here material); In re Pioneer Mill Company, Limited and
International Longshoremen's and Warehousemen's Union, Local 144, Unit
9 (CIO), 6 LA 644 (1947) (discharge commuted to 3/2 mos. layoff for
reasons not here material).
4. In re Caterpillar Tractor Company and United Farm Equipment &
Metal Workers of America, Local 105 (CIO), 6 LA 65 (1946) (discharge
of both employees upheld); In re Palmer-Bee Company and United Steel-
workers of America, Local 1297 (CIO), 2 LA 63 (1945) (reinstatement
with back pay from date of application ordered for reasons immaterial
here); same, Case of Laftus Webb, 8 LA 688 (1947) (discharge com-
muted to 1 mo. suspension for reasons not pertinent here); In re Kraft
Foods Company and Int. Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Ware-
housemen and Helpers of America, Dairy Employees' Union, Local 754(AFL), 9 LA 397 (1947) (discharge upheld); In re Paranite Wire and
Cable Corp. and Int. Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, Local B-1112(AFL), 9 LA 112 (1947); In re McEwan Brothers and United Paper-
workers of America, Local 297 (CIO), 9 LA 854 (1948) (discharge up-
held); In re Hiram Walker and Sons, Inc. and Distillery, Rectifying and
Wine Worker's Int. Union of America, Distillery Workers Union, Local
55 (AFL), 10 LA 675 (1948) (discharge upheld); In re Goodyear Clear-
water Mills, Inc., No. 1 and Textile Workers Union of America, Local
883 (CIO), 8 LA 647 (1947) (discharge of perpetrator allowed); In re
International Harvester Company Farmall Works and United Farm Equip-
ment and Metal Workers of America, Local 109 (CIO), 9 LA 592 (1947).
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employee conduct has occurred, and a discharge is more often
the result than some lesser disciplinary action.
Almost as serious, and frequently just as dangerous, are
assaults upon another. These are not fights in the technical sense
as only one party is at fault. Such manifestations of hostility
vary greatly in degree and kind, interfere with smooth opera-
tions and cause insecurity and apprehension in others. The
penalties invoked are almost as severe as those imposed for
fights since violence and threat of bodily harm are frequently
involved,8 but a simple assault, not amounting to a battery, is
not grounds for discharge.7 To warrant discharge, either fisti-
cuffs must have been used, or the disturbance must have been a
culmination of many such offenses. 8
Cursing and using threatening language which might cause
apprehension in other employees warrant disciplinary action,
even in the absence of violence. The employer's right to disci-
pline arises with any unprivileged profane, intimidating, coer-
cive, or threatening words; even though the speaker contem-
plates no assault,9 and the remark is made in a jocular spiritlo
5. See Notes 3 and 4, supra.
6. In re Branch River Wool Combing Company and Textile Workers
Union of America, Local 390 (CIO), 10 LA 237 (1948) (discharge up-
held); In re Profile Cotton Mills and Textile Workers Union of America,
Local 196 (CIO), 2 LA 537 (1942) (money damages awarded employee
in lieu of discharging supervisor); In re Pioneer Gen-E-Motors Corpora-
tion and United Electrical Workers of America, Local 1150 (CIO), 3 LA
486 (1946) (reinstatement allowed as assault was outside of plant); In
re International Shoe Company and United Shoe Workers of America,
Local 104-A (CIO), 7 LA 669 (1947) (reinstatement allowed as assault
was outside of plant); In re Caterpillar Tractor Company and United
Farm Equipment & Metal Workers of America, Local 105 (CIO), 6 LA
65 (1946) (reinstatement allowed as assault was outside of plant).
7. In re Goodyear Clearwater Mills, Inc. and Textile Workers Union
of America, Local 883 (CIO), 8 LA 647 (1947).
8. In re Chicago Hardware Foundry Company and United Steelworkers
of America, Local 1192 (CIO), 6 LA 58 (1946); In re Link-Belt Company
and United Automobile, Aircraft and Agricultural Implement Workers of
America, Local 281 (CIO), 4 LA 434 (1946); In re Columbian Rope
Company and United Farm Equipment and Metal Workers, Local 184
(CIO), 7 LA 450 (1947); In re Kraft Foods Company and International
Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of
America, Dairy Employees' Union, Local 754 (AFL), 9 LA 397 (1947).
But see, In re A.B.C. Steel and Wire Company and United Wire and
Metal Workers Union, Local 36 (CIO), 3 LA 666 (1946).
9. In re Cedartown Textiles, Inc. and Textile Workers Union of Amer-
ica, Local 820 (CIO), 8 LA 360 (1947) (loss of pay for time lost due to
wrongful discharge sustained).
10. In re Metropolitan Life Insurance Company, Inc. and United Office
and Professional Workers of America (CIO), 2 LA 561 (1945) (loss of
one week's wages sustained).
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The test is the violation of reasonable job decorum so as to cause
apprehension or chagrin in another employee which might
hamper production.," But such breach of decorum must be more
than "somewhat threatening" language, 2 a mere conflict of per-
sonalities or incompatability between two workers," an accusa-
tion of "neglecting work,"1 or a disagreement about methods
of doing the job. 5 The usual indiscretions of everyday inter-
course give an employer no right to discipline.
The penalties invoked for disturbances not culminating in
fights or assaults usually fall short of discharge. 8 A mere warn-
ing is the "rule," and a layoff or discharge is the "exception."
Discharge is only allowed when coupled with another cause, or
when based upon many offenses collectively.17 Thus, in In re
Walworth, Inc.,8 the arbitrator refused to sustain the discharge
of a union committeeman for bringing pressure upon a non-
union man. "We want you in the union, and, if you do not join,
11. In re Montrose Chemical Company, Inc. and United Gas, Coke and
Chemical Workers of America, Local 284 (CIO), 10 LA 317 (1948) (rein-
statement without back pay); In re Textron, Inc. and Textile Workers
Union of America (CIO), 8 LA 744 (1947) (full reinstatement); In re
Metropolitan Life Insurance Company, Inc. and United Office and Pro-
fessional Workers of America (CIO), 2 LA 561 (1945) (discharge com-
muted to one week's loss of pay); In re Walworth Company, Inc. and
International Association of Machinists, District 9 (AFL), 1 LA 151
(1943) (discharge commuted to warning only); In re Thor Corporation
and United Electrical, Radio and Machine Workers of America, Local 1150
(CIO), 10 LA 321 (1948) (discharge commuted to two-week lay-off); In
re Terminal Cab Company, Inc. and International Brotherhood of Team-
sters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of America, Taxi Cab Driv-
ers of Trenton, N. J., Local 433 (AFL), 7 LA 780 (1947) (discharge
commuted to one-week lay-off); In re Columbian Rope Company and
United Farm Equipment and Metal Workers, Local 184 (CIO), 7 LA 450(1947) (full reinstatement allowed).
12. In re Montrose Chemical Company, Inc. and United Gas, Coke and
Chemical Workers of America, Local 284 (CIO), 10 LA 317 (1948) (but
loss of pay sustained for other reasons).
13. In re Loews, Inc., Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios and International
Alliance of Theatrical Stage Employees and Moving Picture Machine Oper-
ators of the United States and Canada, Motion Picture Film Editors, Local
776 (AFL), 8 LA 816 (1947).
14. In re Shell Pipe Line Corporation and International Union of Oper-
ating Engineers, Local 892 (AFL), 6 LA 458 (1947).
15. In re Cedartown Textiles, Inc. and Textile Workers Union of Amer-
ica, Local 820 (CIO), 8 LA 360 (1947) (but loss of pay sustained for
other reasons); In re Power Equipment Company and United Electrical,
Radio & Machine Workers of America, Local 937 (CIO), 2 LA 558 (1945)(full reinstatement with back pay).
16. See note 11, supra.
17. See note 8, supra.
18. In re Walworth Company, Inc. and International Association of
Machinists, District 9 (AFL), 1 LA 151 (1943).
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I will take care of you myself... we will see you in the wash-
room Saturday morning"'" was found to be, in the absence of
-any violence either before or after the statement, a "threat"
which warranted a warning but not a discharge. The union
committeeman was reemployed with full back pay and seniority
Tights. But in In re International Harvester,20 unprovoked curs-
ing and threats of physical violence by a shop steward directed
at a foreman in the presence of other men was held to be a
ground for discharge, the insubordination probably being more
determinative than the threat.
III. WHO ARE PARTICIPANTS?
Actual participants in a fight, assault, or altercation may be
'disciplined. The question, who precipitated the fight, is imma-
terial as long as both parties participate.21 But the employer's
right to discipline applies only to the perpetrator. If the recipi-
ent uses only reasonable means to ward off an assault, he is not
a participant in a fight. In the same way, the use of reasonable
language to alleviate a verbal attack does not make the recipient
-a participant in the altercation. A fight or altercation involves
at least two parties, but only one will be deemed a participant
if the other utilizes reasonable means to protect himself, and
the fight is not one engaged in by mutual consent.2 2 Whether
the self-defense measures were reasonable under all the circum-
stances is the test; and even the use of unreasonable means is
cause only for a lesser penalty than discharge, as we shall see.23
19. Id. at 153.
20. In re International Harvester Company, East Moline Works and
United Farm Equipment and Metal Workers of America, Local 104 (CIO),
-9 LA 563 (1947).
21. In re Stockham Pipe Fittings Company and United Steelworkers
of America (CIO), 1 LA 160 (1945); In re Caterpillar of America Tractor
'Company and United Farm Equipment and Metal Workers of America,
Local 105 (CIO), 6 LA 65 (1946); In re Indiana Railroad, Division of
Wessen Company and Amalgamated Association of Street, Electric Rail-
way and Motor Coach Employees of America, Local 1069 (AFL), 6 LA
"789 (1947).
22. In re Palmer-Bee Company and United Steelworkers of America,
'Local 1297 (CIO), 2 LA 63 (1945) (employee who was attacked and
severely beaten by company official without warning and with little oppor-
tunity to defend himself was reinstated with full rights despite company's
well-established practice to discharge all participants in a fight); In re
Hiram Walker and Sons, Inc. and Distillery Workers Union, Local 55(AFL), 10 LA 675 (1948) (superintendent merely defended himself from
union official's assault).
23. Infra.
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The relationship of participants in a disturbance may vary,
and this affects an arbitrator's determinations of justifiable dis-
ciplinary action. The union may appeal a penalty imposed upon
participants when they are on an equal footing in the factory
hierarchy, or when a lesser employee fights with a foreman or
superintendent, in which case the situation is aggravated, and a
more severe penalty justified. The union may demand dismissal
of a supervisor who has unjustifiably assaulted a lesser employee.
IV. AGGRAVATING AND MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCES
Numerous intervening circumstances may require mitigation
of an otherwise proper penalty, or justify an otherwise improper
penalty. The cause of the disturbance is all-important, and a
more serious penalty may be exacted when an employee is in a
position to, but does not, stop a disturbance. Thus, a discharge
as an accessory (it was conceded that the union representative
was not a participant) to an assault was upheld where the rep-
resentative knew of a plan to "get" an anti-union worker and,
after gaining postponement of the act for a couple of hours,
finally acquiesced in the placing of the non-union man in a "tar"
barrel in the plant . 2
(The) union representative was properly discharged as
accessory to the act .. since (1) no reason was given for
the representative's failure ever to take the matter of the
non-union man's allegedly provocative behavior to the griev-
ance procedure, as was his duty under the contract, and (2)
his own testimony supported the allegation that he favored
the use of force if management did not immediately agree
to transfer the non-union employee.2 5
The representative's non-feasance satisfied any cause require-
ment.
Extraneous circumstances will often have the effect of mitigat-
ing the severity of the penalty imposed. A determination of an
outside cause of the disturbance is the most common mitigating
circumstance. Upon this basis special considerations have been
given to veterans with a service-induced neurosis.2 6 Also, the
24. In re General Motors Corporation and International Union, United
Auto Workers of America, 2 LA 491 (1938).
25. Ibid.
26. In re International Harvester Co., Farmall Works and United Farm
Equipment and Metal Workers of America, Local 109 (CIO), 9 LA 952(1946); In re A.B.C. Steel and Wire Company and United Wire and Metal
Workers Union, Local 36 (CIO), 3 LA 666 (1946).
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company has no right to control employees' activities away from
work. Thus, an employee who engages in adulterous relation-
ships with a non-employee's wife outside the plant cannot be
penalized by the company when the non-employee enters the
plant and fights with the employee while the latter is at his job,
the employee's promiscuity off the job being the cause of the
fracas in the shop.27
Where the company knows of "bad blood" between the em-
ployee and a supervisor and fails to separate them, although
it could easily have done so, the employer's failure to police was
the cause of the disturbance and precluded any right to discharge
for fights arising out of that cause. 28 It was so held where the
company allowed antagonistic relationships to exist between
two departments, and an employee in one engaged in a heated
argument with a supervisor of the other department, the em-
ployee's relationship in her own department and with her own
supervisor being satisfactory. 29 The same circumstance prevents
discharge when an underlying friction has existed between two
employees for a long time and the company had notice (con-
structive or actual) of the private resentment 0
An overzealous union president who assaults a non-union
worker while strengthening union membership (no anti-intimi-
dation clause in contract) received only a one-week layoff, his
performance of a proper union function inducing the assault.31
"Management's abdication of its proper function" in not deter-
mining which of two shifts shall work on Saturdays gives no
right to discharge participants in the melee arising out of the
contest for the overtime.2
There can be no provocation sufficient to warrant an assault,
but provocation may mitigate the penalty.33 A provoked, simple
27. In re Textron, Inc. and Textile Workers Union of America (CIO),
8 LA 744 (1947).
28. In re Dayton Malleable Iron Company and United Electrical, Radio
and Machine Workers of America, Local 768 (CIO), 8 LA 688 (1947).
29. In re Power Equipment Company and United Electrical, Radio &
Machine Workers of America, Local 937 (CIO), 2 LA 558 (1945).
30. In re Verdun Mfg. Co., Inc. and Industrial Trades Union of Amer-
ica, Verdun Mfg. Company Local, 10 LA 637 (1947).
31. In re The Standard Steel Works and United Steelworkers of Amer-
ica, Local 1964 (CIO), 6 LA 136 (1945).
32. In re Fulton Glass Company and Federal Labor Union, No. 24080
(AFL), 10 LA 75 (1948).
33. In re Continental Can Co., Inc. and United Steelworkers of America(CIO), 6 LA 363 (1947).
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assault, not a battery, is no grounds for discharge. 34 Provocatory
language, if proved in defense, permits only a disciplinary lay-
off.3 5 Continued refusal to join a union, or "scabbing" during
a strike (even though by supervisors) has been held sufficient
provocation to mitigate a disciplinary penalty. 6 But anti-union
provocation was held irrelevant where union enthusiasts "dis-
ciplined" a non-union man, where (1) the union had failed to
invoke the grievance procedure, and (2) there was no evidence
that management was using the non-union man to the detriment
of the union. 37 Working all day in the rain is provocative enough
to warrant a profane remark to a proper order of a foreman,
especially when due humility is shown by refusing to repeat the
remark and obeying the order.38 But being called a "fighting
name" is inadequate provocation for an assault upon the name-
caller,3 9 as is the accusation of "neglecting work." 40 Even a
reasonable belief that another employee "was bent on torment-
ing him" did not warrant the use of fisticuffs.4 1
Employers must give all workers who are equally at fault
the same treatment. Evidence of an anti-union motive in the
imposition of disciplinary penalties will result in the setting
aside of such treatment as discriminatory.42 Sound public policy
supports this view when the ulterior motive is sufficiently mani-
fested. The employer's past practice in dealing with similar
offenses may indicate discrimination. If it is proved that the
employees' union membership or activity influenced the penalty,
the remedies of the National Labor Relations Act may be in-
voked. The doctrine has been extended to include other than
34. In re Goodyear Clearwater Mills, Inc. and Textile Workers Union
of America, Local 883 (CIO), 8 LA 647 (1947).
35. In re Columbian Rope Company and United Farm Equipment and
Metal Workers, Local 184 (CIO), 7 LA 450 (1947).
36. In re Pioneer Mill Company, Limited and International Longshore-
men's and Warehousemen's Union, Local 144, Unit 9 (CIO), 6 LA 644(1947).
37. In re General Motors Corporation and International Union, United
Auto Workers of America, 2 LA 491 (1938).
38. In re Thor Corporation and United Electrical, Radio and Machine
Workers of America, Local 1150 (CIO), 10 LA 321 (1948).
39. In re Kraft Foods Company and International Brotherhood of Team-
sters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of America, Dairy Employ-
ees' Union, Local 754 (AFL) 9 LA 397 (1947).
40. In re Shell Pipe Line Corporation and International Union of Oper-
ating Engineers, Local 892 (AFL), 6 LA 458 (1947).
41. In re Branch River Wool Combing Company and Textile Workers
Union of America, Local 390 (CIO), 10 LA 237 (1948).
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union - non-union relations. It is now settled that an employer's
prerogative of discipline for just cause is limited to the indis-
criminate assessment of penalties. 43 Thus, rehiring as a new
employee one of two equally guilty participants in a fight en-
titles the other to employment as of the date of the original
rehiring.44 It is not discriminatory treatment to discharge one
fighting employee at a later time if the grievance committee
gives the employer his first notice of the discrimination at such
later time, and he merely abides by their request., The dis-
charge of one of two fight participants is no evidence of "un-
justified" treatment, there being no discrimination unless the
fighters are equally at fault.4 6 This equality of treatment for
equal blameworthiness has one extremely important qualifica-
tion. Separate offenses by one employee taken together may
justify discharge when any one alone might not.4 7 A discharge
based upon them collectively may be justified, and, thus, not
be discriminatory treatment. In a like manner, a good past
record may sustain continuation of employment.48
A modern industrial plant cannot operate properly in a hostile
atmosphere. The employer may, in his discretion, act to check
personal resentment among employees. The right to act arises
in regard to all disturbances in the plant, notwithstanding the
fact that employees have not as yet "punched in,"'4 or are tem-
42. In re Pioneer Mill Company, Limited and International Longshore-
men's and Warehousemen's Union, Local 114, Unit 9 (CIO), 6 LA 644
(1947).
43. In re Hiram Walker and Sons, Inc. and Distillery, Rectifying and
Wine Workers' International Union of America, Distillery Workers' Union,
Local 55 (AFL), 10 LA 675 (1948); in re McEwan Brothers and United
Paperworkers of America, Local 297 (CIO), 9 LA 854 (1948); In re
Paranite Wire and Cable Corp. and International Brotherhood of Elec-
trical Workers, Local B-1112 (AFL), 9 LA 112 (1947).
44. In re Paranite Wire and Cable Corp. and International Brotherhood
of Electrical Workers, Local B-1112 (AFL), 9 LA 112 (1947).
45. In re McEwan Brothers and United Paperworkers of America, Local
297 (CIO), 9 LA 854 (1948) (where employer didn't know he was dis-
criminating until notification by the grievance committee).
46. In re Branch River Wool Combing Company and Textile Workers
Union of America, Local 390 (CIO), 10 LA 237 (1948); In re Pioneer
Mill Company, Limited and International Longshoremen's and Warehouse-
men's Union, Local 144, Unit 9 (CIO), 6 LA 644 (1947).
47. See note 8, supra.
48. In re Caterpillar Tractor Company and United Farm Equipment
and Metal Workers of America, Local 105 (CIO), 6 LA 65 (1946); See
In re Continental Can Co., Inc. and United Steelworkers of America (6I0),
6 LA 363 (1947).
49. In re The Standard Steel Works and United Steelworkers of Amer-
ica, Local 1964 (CIO), 6 LA 136 (1946).
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porarily off duty.50 But an employee may abstain from an act
of violence while at work, and once outside the plant assault
his superior. The problem of when an employer may discipline
employees for a fight or altercation outside the plant without
unduly supervising their personal lives, is one of causation. The
dispute must have started during the working hours,51 and the
assault must (1) be a culmination of a virtually continuous af-
fair which started in the plant in connection with the work, 2
or (2) have a direct bearing upon intra-plant relations,53 that
is, be directly connected with incidents which occurred inside
the plant5
An employer's contractual right to discipline extends to
fights outside the plant between employees and members of
management if, but only if, the attack is undertaken 'to
affect adversely the contractually sanctioned employee rela-
tions in the plant'. 5
The slugging of a non-union member outside the company prop-
erty was held not to warrant a discharge unless it be proved
that the purpose of the assault was to force an employee into
joining a union contrary to an "anti-coercion" clause in the
contract.56 Indulging in a private resentment outside the plant
50. In re Indiana Railroad, Division of Wesson Company and Amalga-
mated Association of Street, Electric Railway and Motor Coach Employees
of America, Local 1069 (AFL), 6 LA 789 (1947).
51. In re Pioneer Gen-E-Motors Corporation and United Electrical Work-
ers of America, Local 1150 (CIO), 3 LA 486 (1946).
52. In re International Shoe Company and United Shoe Workers ofAmerica, Local 104-A (CIO), 7 LA 669 (1947). But see, In re Terminal
Cab Company, Inc. and International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs,Warehousemen and Helpers of America, Taxi Cab Drivers of Trenton,
N. J., Local 433 (AFL), 7 LA 780 (1947) where the arbitrator, H. CollinMinton, said the following: "[An] . .. employer is not entitled to dis-
charge employee for threatening supervisory employee with bodily injury
where the alleged threats, which were aftermath of altercation at work,
were made while both parties were off duty and off company property.
Fact that the employee's 'personal differences' arose out of company busi-
ness is irrelevant." (Only one week lay-off was allowed as penalty for the
employee's participation in the altercation at work.)53. In re Chicago Hardware Foundry Company and United Steelwork-
ers of America, Local 1192 (CIO), 6 LA 58 (1946):
54. In re National Lock Company and United Automobile, Aircraft andAgricultural Implement Workers of America, Local 449 (CIO), 10 LA15 (1948); In re Hiram Walker and Sons, Inc. and Distillery, Rectifying
and Wine Workers' International Union of America, Distillery Workers
Union, Local 55 (AFL), 10 LA 675 (1948).
55. In re International Harvester Company, Farmall Works and United
Farm Equipment and Metal Workers of America, Local 109 (CIO), 9
LA 592 (1947).
56. In re Caterpillar Tractor Company and United Farm Equipment &
Metal Workers of America, Local 105 (CIO), 6 LA 65 (1946).
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so as to challenge the authority of a plant supervisor is grounds
for disciplinary action short of discharge. 5
Some arbitrators have mitigated disciplinary penalities be-
cause of civil or criminal charges brought against the employee.
They have felt that the employer should have a more limited
right of discipline when a participant is a defendant in a legal
action. Others have upheld the employer's prerogative irrespec-
tive of penalties imposed outside the plant. The latter view
was enunciated by Mr. Clark Kerr, arbitrator, in In re Pioneer
Mill Company, Ltd.574
The arbitrator is not concerned with the appropriateness
of penalties under the law, if any, but solely with the pro-
priety of disciplinary action by the company. The question
before the arbitrator is, aside from such penalties as society
may see fit to assess, what additional penalties, if any,
should be placed against these men by the company.,8
Although penal or civil judgments against the erring employee,
or litigation of any sort whereby the employee would stand costs
of defending an action, should not finally determine penalties,
most arbitrators recognize such a circumstance as limiting the
employer's right upon the theory that full punishment has been
rendered by the judiciary.;
WILLIAM R. HIRscH
DAMAGE TO, OR LOSS OF, MACHINES AND MATERIALS
It will surprise only the uninitiated that there are little more
than a score of arbitration awards dealing with damage to, or
destruction of, machines or materials as a ground for discipline
or discharge. The vast majority of disputes between employer
and employee are "decided" at the foreman level, or in informal
meetings between representatives of the workers and manage-
ment. And this would seem to apply particularly to difficulties
arising out of the types of wrong-doing considered in this note.
Nevertheless, the cases which have arisen permit of some gen-
57. In re Verdun Mfg. Company, Inc. and Industrial Trades Union of
America, Verdun Mfg. Company Local, 10 LA 637 (1947).
58. In re Pioneer Mill Company, Limited and International Longshore-
men's and Warehousemen's Union, Local 144, Unit 9 (CIO), 6 LA 644(1947).
59. In re Verdun Mfg. Company, Inc. and Industrial Trades Union of
America, Verdun Mfg. Company Local, 10 LA 637 (1947).
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